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Abstract
This paper aims to address the issue of public pension reforms under
demographic ageing that is likely to occur in Europe over the next 50 years.
Three possible scenarios are analysed in a Blanchard OLG framework.
These include: i) a decrease both in public pensions and the lump sum
labour income tax, ii) a decrease both in public pensions and the distor-
tionary corporate tax, iii) an increase in the retirement age. The analysis
focuses on the eﬀects of these ﬁscal policies on key economic variables such
as consumption, private and public debt, output and wages. Quantitative
experiments assess the impact of diﬀerent ﬁscal policies in terms of public
debt sustainability but most importantly suggest policies that smooth the
transition of the economy to the new equilibrium. The main results suggest
that the adverse eﬀects of pension reforms on consumption are moderated
when they are accompanied by appropriate taxation policies. In particular,
when the tax response is rapid most of the adverse movement in consump-
tion is avoided while public and national debt reach lower equilibrium levels.
JEL codes: E6; H3; J1; H55
Keywords: Ageing, Pension Reforms, Taxation, Overlapping Genera-
tions5
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Non-technical summary
This paper addresses the issue of pension reforms under demographic change
that are likely to occur in Europe over the next 50 years. This demographic change
is characterised not only by lower population growth but also by the alteration of
the population structure, with a decline in the proportion of young people to re-
tired workers. This has substantial ripple eﬀects on public pension systems, which
in Europe are mostly ﬁnanced in a pay-as-you-go manner, i.e. current pensions
are ﬁnanced by current revenues through payroll taxes on employees. An ageing
population puts a burden on current employees as a higher ratio of pensioners to
employees necessitates higher tax contributions to maintain the sustainability of
the public pension system. In the last forty years, substantial increases in income
taxes have been imposed to ﬁnance public pension systems causing a number of
labour market distortions such as a lower participation rate. Against this back-
drop, European governments are considering a series of reforms that will ensure
sustainability of public pension systems and may boost the already rigid European
labour market.
In this paper, we employ a theoretical framework to analyse diﬀerent public
pension reform schemes and the response of the economy in the short and medium
run. We assume that the government can use diﬀerent taxation schemes to mini-
mize adverse eﬀects (of the pension reform) during the transition of the economy to
a new equilibrium with a reformed pension system. We examine diﬀerent taxation
responses that can cushion the initial adverse eﬀect on consumption. To model
these eﬀects, we use the workhorse framework of Blanchard (1985) with overlap-
ping generations and ﬁnite horizons. To capture life cycle behaviour and introduce
pension systems, we adopt a modiﬁed version of the framework in Nielsen (1994)
and Heijdra and Bettendorf (2005). We depart from the set-up in these studies
by allowing for an unbalanced pension system and budget deﬁcits because one of
our main aims is to study the dynamics of public debt during pension reforms. In
addition, we illustrate the impact of declining population and ageing by allowing
for diﬀerent birth and death rates (Buiter, 1988) and age dependent labour pro-
ductivity. Another departure from the existing literature is a realistic supply side
where ﬁrms issue equities and face adjustment costs in investment. This enables us
to consider the impact of pension reforms on capital accumulation and investment
decisions.
In addition we also examine diﬀerent ﬁscal policies that can be used to "soften"
the negative impact that reforms may cause. The model employed in this paper is
not of the magnitude of large scale simulation models, but our simple framework
can be used readily for quick quantitative assessment of ﬁscal policy experiments.
Most importantly it enables us to observe the transition path of the main macro-
economic variables from the current state to the new long run equilibrium featuring6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 863
February 2008
the desired pension system.
Against this backdrop, three policy experiments are analysed: (a) a suspension
of the public pension system accompanied by a fall of the lump sum income tax;
(b) a suspension of the pension systems accompanied by a fall in the corporate
tax rate and (c) the eﬀect of an increase of the pension age on private and public
ﬁnances.
The ﬁndings suggest that when drastic pension cuts are accompanied by a
reduction of the corporate distortionary tax on ﬁrms’ gross output (case (b)), the
adverse eﬀects on per capita consumption are minimised in the short run while
in the long run output and consumption are higher whilst private and public
indebtedness reach lower levels.
The same impact on the demand side can be observed when a lump sum income
tax is used instead (case (a)). However, the supply side remains unaﬀected by
these ﬁscal measures and their impact on the long run consumption is considerably
smaller.
The outcome of both these policies is aﬀected by the reaction function that the
government uses to adjust to public debt developments. In other words if the gov-
ernment reacts rapidly and adjusts taxes then the negative impact on consumption
can be minimised.
T h el a s tp o l i c ye x p e r i m e n tm o d e l sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h er e t i r e m e n ta g ea n dl e a v e s
the amount of pension beneﬁts unchanged. This policy appears to be unsuccessful
in economies with high levels of public debt especially if the aim is lower public
indebtedness. Even if this policy measure is able to sustain the current ﬁscal
position, the young generations of declining population eventually have to pay
high taxes to sustain the pension system.7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 863
February 2008
1 Introduction
Europe is experiencing a major demographic transition. This demographic change
not only includes lower population growth but also alters the population structure
with a decline in the proportion of young people to retired workers. These changes
are due to both declining birth rates and higher life expectancies. Ageing and
as l o w d o w ni np o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hh a san u m b e ro fi m p l i c a t i o n sf o rd i ﬀerent as-
pects of the economy and the society— potentially even leading not only to "lower
technical eﬃciency and economic welfare but also to less intellectual and artistic
achievements as well" (Report of the Royal Commission on Population, 1949).
Ageing critically aﬀects pension systems which in turn play a crucial role in the
welfare of retired and elderly. In most European countries public pensions are a
large part of the retirement income. In many cases, especially in Southern Europe,
public pensions provide the main source of income to the retired.
In Europe most public pension systems operate under pay as you go (PAYG)
plans. In PAYG systems current pensions are usually ﬁnanced by revenues through
taxes on employees. An ageing population puts a burden on current employees as
a higher ratio of pensioners to employed means higher payments for sustainable
public pension funds. The last forty years have seen a substantial increase in
labour income taxes imposed to ﬁnance public pension funds causing a number of
labour market distortions such as a lower participation rate.
In order to face the challenge of the new demographic map, European govern-
ments are considering a series of reforms that will ensure sustainability of public
pension systems and may boost the relatively rigid European labour market. How-
ever pension reforms as part of ﬁscal policy have important implications for the rest
of the macroeconomy: In the pioneering work of Feldstein (1974) it was shown that
the introduction of unfunded social security can lower savings and private wealth.
P e o p l eo fw o r k i n ga g ed on o tn e e dt os a v ea sm u c ha sb e f o r eb e c a u s et h e yw i l l
receive public beneﬁts after a certain age (replacement eﬀect). On the other hand,
agents may try to retire earlier and increase their savings more while working (in-
duced eﬀect). Thus the level of private savings depends on which eﬀect prevails. In
any case, savings and investment decisions which determine the net asset position
of a country are aﬀected. Most theoretical studies agree that a reduction of pen-
sion beneﬁts can lead to higher savings levels and an improvement in the net asset
position of a country while empirically this eﬀect is not so clear. Nevertheless,
the announcement of lower public pension beneﬁts in the future will have adverse
eﬀects on the short and medium run consumpti o nl e v e l sa sa g e n t si n c r e a s es a v i n g s
to provide for their retirement.
In the present paper we examine diﬀerent public pension reform schemes and
the response of the economy in the short and medium run. We postulate that the
government can use diﬀerent taxation schemes to minimize adverse eﬀects of the8
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pension reform during the transition of the economy to a new equilibrium with a
reformed pension system. We examine diﬀerent taxation responses that can cush-
ion the initial adverse eﬀect on consumption. The workhorse modelling framework
of Blanchard (1985) with overlapping generations and ﬁnite horizons is employed.
In order to capture life cycle behaviour and introduce public pension systems, we
adopt a modiﬁed version of the framework in Nielsen (1994) and Bettendorf and
Heijdra (2005). We depart from the set up in these studies by allowing for an
unbalanced pension system and budget deﬁcits as one of our main aims is to study
the dynamics of public debt during pension reforms. In addition, we illustrate
the impact of a declining population and ageing by allowing for diﬀerent birth and
death rates (Buiter, 1988) and age dependent labour productivity. Another depar-
ture from the existing literature is a realistic supply side where ﬁrms issue equities
and face adjustment costs in investment. This enables us to consider the impact
of public pension reforms on capital accumulation and investment decisions. We
also employ a simulation algorithm that does not rely on log linearisation near the
initial steady state. Although used frequently, this technique can result in seri-
ous approximation errors in models where the long run equilibrium after a policy
intervention may be very distant in the future1.
The scope of this paper is not only to examine the eﬀects of pension reforms but
also to evaluate diﬀerent ﬁscal policies that can be used to "soften" the negative
impact that reforms may cause. The model employed in this paper is not of the size
of large scale simulation models, but our simple framework can be used readily for
a quick quantitative assessment of ﬁscal policy experiments. Most importantly it
enables us to observe the transition path of the main macroeconomic variables from
the current state to the new long run equilibrium featuring the desired pension
system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up the
Yaari-Blanchard model which features ageing population and an unfunded public
pension system. The laws of motion for main macroeconomic variables and the long
run equilibrium of the economy are presented. Section 3 sets out a quantitative
analysis of three policy experiments: (a) a suspension of the public pension system
accompanied by a fall of the lump sum income tax , (b) a suspension of the pension
system combined by a fall in the proportional corporate tax rate and (c) the eﬀect
of an increase of the pension age on private and public ﬁnances. Section 4 provides
concluding remarks.
1see Temple 2003.9
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2T h e M o d e l
We consider a small open economy in a one good world with perfect competition
and perfect international capital mobility. The single good which is produced do-
mestically is used for both consumption and investment purposes and it is a perfect
substitute for foreign goods. The interest rate enters exogenously in the model as
we assume a small open economy where the accumulation of assets and capital
stock does not aﬀect the interest rate. Therefore rdomestic = rworld. The economy
consists of three sectors: households, ﬁrms and the government. Households op-
timize their utility intertemporally and ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts according to
their respective constraints. The behaviour of households and ﬁrms is determined
at the microeconomic level. The government is not an optimizing entity and faces
an intertemporal budget constraint and a tax reaction function while it maintains
an unfunded pension system.
2.1 Households
We begin our analysis by deriving the conditions related to an individual house-
hold’s optimal behaviour and then proceed to look at the aggregate behaviour
patterns. Following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) a person born at time
s ≤ t faces a constant, age invariant probability of death γ. T h el e n g t ho fl i f ei s
t h eo n l ys o u r c eo fu n c e r t a i n t yf o rt h ea g e n tw h i l eh u m a nw e a l t hh(z) and ﬁnancial
wealth f(z), z ≥ t, are held with certainty. At each time t, the agent derives utility
from the consumption of both private and public goods, c and ¯ G respectively:
Us,t ≡
Z ∞
t
e
−(ρ+γ)(z−t) (logc(s,z)+ψlogG)dz (1)
where ρ i st h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dψ (0 <ψ<1) measures the impact
of government consumption on the utility of the household.
The ﬂow budget identity of an individual of age s + t at time t is given by:
cs,t(z)=yis,t(z)+( r + γ)f(z) − ˙ f(z) (2)
where yi stands for non-interest income, f for the household’s non human or
ﬁnancial wealth and r is the exogenous rate of interest. Agents are not altruistic
and do not leave any positive or negative bequests to their descendants. This
implies the existence of competitive life insurance companies which oﬀer a premium
(r+γ) to individuals while alive in exchange for their ﬁnancial wealth upon death2.
The ﬁnancial wealth f is held in the form of equities v,p r i v a t eb o n d sbP, and public
2For a more detailed analysis, see Blanchard O. and S. Fischer (1989), chapter 3.10
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bonds bG. Agents can buy a share of ﬁrms’ future proﬁts in the stock market in the
form of equities. A ﬁrm’s market value at time t, v, is the present discounted value
of the future dividends d paid by the ﬁrm to shareholders: Vt =
R ∞
t e−rtd(z)dz.
The dividends that a ﬁrm has to pay to its shareholders equal the diﬀerence
between the ﬁrm’s after tax output and the sum of its investment and wage expen-
diture: Dt =( 1 −τ)Qt−ytLt−It(1+
gIt
2Kt). Self-fulﬁlling speculative asset price bub-
bles are ruled out: limz→∞ v(z)e−
U z
t (r+γ)dµ =0 . Agents can issue debt in the form
of private bonds bP and can buy government debt bG. The intertemporal No-Ponzi-
Game condition is imposed: limz→∞ bP(z)e−
U z
t (r+γ)dµ =0 . The net ﬁnancial hold-
ings of a household of generation s at time t is: f(s,t)=v(s,t)+bG(s,t)−bP(s,t).
All forms of ﬁnancial assets are perfect substitutes and carry the same rate of
return.
Households supply one unit of labour to ﬁrms inelastically and receive a wage
payment of y which is age dependent. However, employees’ productivity is declin-
ing with age and a way to model it is to introduce an eﬃciency index which falls
exponentially with age: E(z − s)=woe−ξ(z−s).T h u st h en e tw a g ei n c o m eo fa n
individual at time t, y(s,t) is :
y(s,t)=woe
−ξ(t−s)MPL(k(t)),f o rt ≥ s,
where ξ determines the speed at which eﬃciency falls by age and w0 is a positive
parameter. The higher is ξ, the faster income wage is falling. If ξ =0then wage is
not age dependent but it remains constant throughout life. This is an important
feature of the perpetual youth literature as it enables us to model ageing and the
need for life cycle savings and pensions.
Young households receive a wage income (y)f r o mﬁrms and have to pay a
lump sum tax φ until the age of s +π to partly ﬁnance government expenditure,
debt interest payments and public pensions. After this age and till their death
old households receive a lump sum pension beneﬁt σ. The parameter π has been
characterised by Bettendorf and Heijdra (2005) as loosely referring to the retire-
ment age since households never really retire: they keep on working during their
whole lifetime but they receive decreasing labour income since wage depends on
productivity and age (see below).
In this structure the non interest income for a person of generation s at time t
has the following proﬁle:
yi(s,t)=y(t) − φ(t) if t ≤ s + π,
= y(t)+¯ σ if t>s+ π.
Households maximise their utility (1) with respect to budget constraint (2) to
derive the optimal consumption plans:11
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˙ c(s,z)
c(s,z)
=( r − ρ). (3)
We can use the Euler equation (3) to determine consumption as a function of total
(human and ﬁnancial) wealth:
c(s,t)=( ρ + γ)[h(s,t)+f(s,t)], (4)
where ρ + γ is the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth. By inte-
grating (2) and using the solvency condition we derive the intertemporal budget
constraint:
Z ∞
t
e
−
U z
t (r+γ)dµc(s,z)dz =
Z ∞
t
e
−
U z
t (r+γ)dµ[yi(s,z)]dz + f(s,t)=w(s,t).
The human wealth of an individual is deﬁned as the net present value of all
future non interest income:
h(s,t)=
Z ∞
t
e
−
U z
t (r+γ)dµ[yi(s,z)]dz.
Since the non interest income diﬀers for retirees and young workers, we have to
deﬁne two cases: The human wealth of a retiree of generation s at period t can
be deﬁned as:
[h(s,t)]t−s>π ≡
∞ Z
t
y(s,z)e
−
U z
t (r+γ)dµdz +
σ
r + γ
.
The expression above states that the human wealth of a retiree is his wage income
which is very low at this stage plus the public beneﬁt discounted.
The human wealth of a young worker of generation s at time t can be expressed
as:
[h(s,t)]0<t−s≤π ≡
∞ Z
t
y(s,z)e
−
U z
t (r+γ)dµdz−
s+π Z
t
φe
−
U z
t (r+γ)dµdz+
∞ Z
s+π
σe
−
U z
t (r+γ)dµdz
=
∞ Z
t
y(s,z)e
−(r+γ)(z−t)dz −
φ
(r + γ)
(1−e
−(r+γ)(s+π−t))+
σ
(r + γ)
e
−(r+γ)(s+π−t)12
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The equation above states that the human wealth of a young worker is the sum
of his declining wage income (net of taxes) that he is going to pay until the age
of s + π and the discounted pension beneﬁtt h a th ei sg o i n gt or e c e i v ew h e nh e
reaches the retirement age. This deﬁnition of human wealth is crucial in this set
up because it allows us to introduce (a) heterogeneity among agents and (b) a
social security system.
2.2 Demographics
At this point we introduce population characteristics to allow for net population
dynamics. Migration is not considered. We distinguish the probability of death γ
from the birth rate η which are both exogenous. The growth of population L at
any point of time t is deﬁned as:
L(˙ t)
L(t)
= η − γ = hL.
The path of the population evolution is: L(t)=e(η−γ)t, given the initial condition
L(0) = 1.
Following Buiter (1988), the size of a cohort born at time s (L(s,s))i sa
proportion η of the existing population L(s) at that time: L(s,s)=ηL(s).A t
every instance there is also a cohort that dies with a probability γ. At any time
t (t>s ) the size of a cohort born at time s would be: L(s,t)=eγ(s−t)L(s,s)=
eγ(s−t)ηL(s)=ηe−γteηs.
In this system the fraction of the young workers who pay a lump sum tax for
the social security is 1−e−ηπ while the old workers who receive beneﬁts are e−ηπ.
The old age dependency ratio is given by: dep(π)= e−ηπ
1−e−ηπ.
2.3 Aggregation
Having derived the household’s optimal consumption path we next aggregate
across generations. The relation between aggregate and individual variables is
given by:
X(t)=
Z t
−∞
L(s,t)x(s,t)ds,
where L(s,t)=ηe−γteηs. All aggregate variables are denoted in capital letters.
The aggregate consumption in period t is the sum of consumption of individuals
from all cohorts:
C(t)=
Z t
−∞
L(s,t)c(s,t)ds =( ρ + γ)[H(t)+F(t)]. (5)13
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The expression above states that the aggregate consumption at any period t is
a positive function of total wealth (which is the sum of aggregate human wealth
H(t) and aggregate ﬁnancial wealth F(t)) where the parameters of the subjective
discount factor and the probability of death are the propensity to consume out
of wealth. Invariance of the individual spending propensity with respect to age
is reﬂected in the equality between the individual and the aggregate spending
propensities.
The aggregate human wealth consists of the human wealth of the old and young
households:
H(t)=
t−π Z
−∞
L(s,t)h
old(s,t)ds +
t Z
t−π
L(s,t)h
young(s,t)ds.
The aggregate human wealth of old households is the net present value of their
wage income and of their pension beneﬁts:
H
old(t)=
t−π Z
−∞
L(s,t)
£
h
old(s,t)
¤
ds = L(t)
∙
ηΩ(t)
ξ + γ
e
−π(ξ+η) +
σ
r + γ
e
−ηπ
¸
,
where Ω(t)=
∞ Z
t
e(ξ+r+γ)(t−z)w0y(s,z)dz.
Aggregating across the young generations we obtain their human wealth:
H
young(t)=
t Z
t−π
L(s,t)[h
young(s,t)]ds =
= L(t)
(
η
η+ξΩo(t)(1 − e−π(ξ+η)) − φ(t)
η
(r+γ−η)(r+γ)(e−π(γ+r) − e−ηπ)
−φ(t) 1
r+γ(1 − e−ηπ) − σ
η
(r+γ−η)(r+γ)(e−π(γ+r) − e−γπ)
)
By adding and simplifying the two expressions above we have aggregate human
wealth:
H(t)=L(t)
½
η
ξ + η
Ωo(t)+
σ
(r + γ)
e
−ηπ −
φ(t)
(r + γ)
(1 − e
−ηπ)
¾
+L(t)
η(e−ηπ + e−π(r+γ))
(r + γ − η)(r + γ)
(φ(t)+σ).14
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Note that the aggregate human wealth consists of the aggregate wage income
net of tax payments by the young generations plus pensions received by the old
generations. The last term reﬂects the ﬁscal eﬀect on human wealth caused by
changes in population3.
The dynamic path of the aggregate human wealth is:
˙ H(t)=( ξ + r + η)H(t) − YI(t)+ (6)
L(t)
½
−
ξ
r + γ
¡
σe
−ηπ − φ(t)(1 − e
−ηπ)
¢¾
+
L(t)
½
η(ξ + r + γ)
(r + γ − η)(r + γ)
(e
−π(r+γ) − e
−ηπ)(φ(t)+σ)
¾
,
where YIstands for the aggregate non interest income and is equal to:
YI(t)=L(t)
½
ηw0
η + ξ
y(t)+σe
−ηπ − φ(t)(1 − e
−ηπ)
¾
.
We deﬁne the aggregate ﬁnancial wealth as: F(t)=
R t
−∞ f(s,t)L(t,s)ds. The
dynamics of the aggregate ﬁnancial wealth are given by:
˙ F(t)=rF(t)+YI(t) − C(t). (7)
Since the optimal decision for consumption of the aggregate household sector is
C(t)=( ρ+γ)[H(t)+F(t)], intuitively the evolution of consumption jointly depends
o nt h et i m ep a t h so fh u m a na n dﬁnancial wealth: ˙ C(t)=( ρ+γ)[ ˙ H(t)+ ˙ F(t)]. By
substituting and simplifying we obtain the dynamics for aggregate consumption:
˙ C(t)=( η + ξ + r − ρ − γ)C(t) − (η + ξ)(ρ + γ)F(t) −
L(t)(ρ + γ)
ξ
r + γ
£
σe
−ηπ − φ(t)(1 − e
−ηπ)
¤
− (8)
L(t)(ρ + γ)
η(ξ + r + γ)(e−π(r+γ) − e−ηπ)
(r + γ − η)(r + γ)
(φ(t)+σ).
This is the usual Ramsey equation modiﬁed for overlapping generations where the
change in consumption depends on ﬁnancial wealth. Note that the demographic
structure and the pension system inﬂuence optimal consumption decisions. If the
pension system was balanced, i.e. beneﬁts were equal to contributions, there would
be no direct eﬀects on aggregate consumption apart from the ﬁscal eﬀect through
the generational turnover (the last term). However, in the above expression we see
that the pension system can inﬂuence negatively consumption growth.
3For example, if population is decreasing or η<r+ γ then
η(e−π(r+γ)−e−ηπ)
(r+γ−η)(r+γ) > 0. Since less
people are born, the ﬁscal eﬀect is positive on the aggregate human wealth as less tax is paid
while more pensions are given.15
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2.4 Government
The government provides a lump sum pension beneﬁt to all senior households in the
economy and spends on the public good. It ﬁnances its total expenditure by taxing
the gross output of ﬁrms and imposing a lump sum tax on the young households.
The government is not a maximizing entity. It only fulﬁls its intertemporal budget
constraint:
˙ B
G(t)= ¯ G + L(t)
£
e
−ηπ¯ σ − (1 − e
−ηπ)φ(t)
¤
− τQ(t)+rB
G(t), (9)
where
φ(t)=
β
1 − e−ηπb(t)
G −
τ
1 − e−ηπo(t). (10)
and τ is the proportional tax rate on ﬁrms’ gross output Q.
The lump sum tax paid by young households adjusts to a certain extent to
changes in public debt and output in order to avoid unsustainable situations.
The parameter β reﬂects how quickly the lump sum tax adjusts to changes in
public debt and can be an eﬀective ﬁscal tool because it can smooth or exacerbate
transitions of the economy following pension reforms as we will see later on. The
No-Ponzi condition applies: limt→∞ e−
U t
0 rdµBG(t)=0
2.5 The Supply Side: Firms
The production sector consists of a large number of identical ﬁrms (owned entirely
by households) which produce a single good under conditions of perfect compe-
tition. The ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts and face distortionary taxes on output.
Distortionary taxation is another departure from Blanchard’s framework where
less realistic lump sum taxes are assumed. In our analysis the economy does not
experience perpetual growth but production is subject to the law of diminishing
returns. Firms invest and buy capital from perfectly integrated capital markets.
Labour supply is ﬁxed inelastically at unity and is assumed to be perfectly im-
mobile across countries. Firms employ labour and capital to produce output by
using a linearly homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production function which is subject
to constant returns of scale:
Q(t)=AK(t)
aL(t)
1−a,
where 0 <a<1.T h eﬁrms own their capital stock and households have a claim
on the ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the form of dividends. Capital accumulation is deﬁned by:
˙ K(t)=I(t) − δK(t), (11)16
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where I(t) is gross investment δ is the rate of depreciation. Following the Tobin’s q
theory of investment, private investment is subject to increasing and convex costs of
adjustment. A ﬁrm’s investment pattern is given by the adjustment cost function:
I(.)=I +
gI2
2K w h e r egi st h er a t ea tw h i c ha d j u s t m e n tc o s t sr i s ew i t hi n v e s t m e n t
(I0(.) > 0 and I00(.) > 0). Including installation costs to our model allows us to
provide well deﬁned investment and saving decisions where investment is not a
passive function of savings4.T h eﬁrm maximizes the present discounted value of
its after tax proﬁts by choosing the optimal level of labour and investment:
Vo =
Z ∞
t=0
e
−rt
∙
(1 − τ)Q(t) − y(t)L(t) − I(t)(1 +
gI(t)
2K(t)
)
¸
,
subject to the evolution of the capital stock, the initial and the transversality
conditions for capital:
˙ K(t)=I(t) − δK(t); K0 = K(0); limt−>∞e−rtµtqtKt =0 , (12)
where µtqt is the co-state variable or the shadow price of capital in period t.F r o m
the three ﬁrst order conditions we derive the optimal wage and investment level:
y(t)=
ηw0
η + ξ
(1 − τ)(1 − a)AK(t)
aN(t)
−a, (13)
I(t)=
µ
q(t) − 1
g
¶
K(t). (14)
The above relation is the usual proﬁt maximization condition according to which
the ﬁrm employs labour up to the point where the after tax marginal product of
labour is equal to the wage rate. The second condition indicates the investment
decision of the ﬁrm which depends positively on the shadow price of capital.
Lastly, the ﬁrst order condition associated with the capital stock states the
dynamics for the shadow price of capital:
˙ q(t)=( δ + r)q(t) − a(1 − τ)
µ
ηw0
η + ξ
¶1−a
AK(t)
a−1 +
g
2
µ
I(t)
K(t)
¶2
(15)
4Note that our set up of capital accumulation is a departure from Bettendorf and Heijdra
(2005) who introduce traded and non traded goods and assume that only non traded goods are
used for investment. Increasing marginal costs of production in the non traded goods sector
results in ﬁnite rate of investment. In contrast this paper follows a more mainstream approach
by using a simple Cobb-Douglas production function and adjustment costs in investment. In
Nielsen (1994) agents hold physical capital and their savings decision directly aﬀect the capital
stock in the economy which is not subject to adjustment costs.17
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According to Hayashi (1982) the shadow price of the installed capital q is also
deﬁned as the ratio of the stock market value of capital to the capital replacement
cost as long as the production function is subject to constant returns of scale which
i st h ec a s ei nt h i sm o d e l :
q(t)=
V (t)
K(t)
.
In order to ﬁnd the intertemporal shadow price of capital we can use the dynamics
of q. By integrating (15) and using the transversality condition (12) q is equal to:
qt =
Z ∞
t=0
"
a(1 − τ)
µ
ηw0
η + ξ
¶1−a
AK(t)
a−1 +
g
2
µ
I(t)
K(t)
¶2#
e
−rtdt. (16)
Equation (16) states that the intertemporal shadow price of capital is equal to
the present discounted value of the marginal product of capital and the marginal
reduction in adjustment costs from an increase in the capital stock. Given the
interest rate, the investment decision does not depend on the utility function, the
consumption decision of the households, or the level of private and public debt.
However, since V = qK, the shadow price of capital aﬀects not only the investment
decision of ﬁrms but also the consumption pattern of households through their
equity holdings.
2.6 The Current Account and Market Equilibrium
F r o mt h ed y n a m i c so fﬁnancial wealth (7), public debt (9), and equities we derive
the net foreign asset position of the private sector. In order to capture the full
eﬀects of ﬁscal policies we assume that all government debt is bought by domestic
households. Hence the country’s net foreign asset position is identical to private
sector indebtedness to the rest of the world BP(t):
˙ B
P(t)=C(t)+I(.)+ ¯ G + rB
P(t) − Q(t). (17)
The following expression provides the clearing condition for the goods market:
gross domestic product is equal to domestic absorption and the current account
surplus:
Q(t)=C(t)+I(.)+ ¯ G − ˙ B
P(t)+rB
P(t).
2.7 Model Summary
In Table 1 we present the dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables in a
stationary form relative to population size L(t). All variables are functions of time
and have been divided by the population size at time t.18
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Table 1: Key Equations of the Model
Laws of motion:
Capital: ˙ k =(
q−1
g − δ − η + γ)k (S.1)
Tobin’s q: ˙ q =( r + δ)q − a(1 − τ)(
ηw0
η+ξ)1−aAka−1 +
(q−1)2
2g (S.2)
Consumption: ˙ c =( ξ + r − ρ)c − (η + ξ)(ρ + γ)(bg + qk − bp) (S.3)
−
ξ(ρ+γ)
r+γ [σe−ηπ − φ(1 − e−ηπ)] +
η(ρ+γ)(ξ+r+γ)(e−π(r+γ)−e−ηπ)
(r+γ−η)(r+γ) (φ + σ)
Private debt: ˙ bp = c +( r − η + γ)bp −
¡ηw0
η+ξ
¢1−a Aka +
(q2−1)
2g k + ge (S.4)
Public debt: ˙ bg = ge+ σe−ηπ − φ(1 − e−ηπ) − τ
¡ηw0
η+ξ
¢1−a Aka +( r − η + γ)bg (S.5)
Static equations:
Output: o =(
ηw0
η+ξ)1−aAka (S.6)
Dividends: d ≡ (1 − τ)
¡ηw0
η+ξ
¢1−a Aka − y −
(q2−1)
2g k (S.7)
Wage y =
¡ηw0
η+ξ
¢1−a (1 − τ)(1 − a)Aka (S.8)
Tax on φ =
β
1−e−ηπbG − τ
1−e−ηπo (S.9)
young househ.
Steady State
In the long run the economy reaches its equilibrium and the endogenous vari-
ables take the following equilibrium values:
¯ q =1+( δ + η − γ)g, (18)
¯ k =(
ηw0
η + ξ
)
"
(r + δ)¯ q +
(¯ q−1)2
2g
Aa(1 − τ)
# 1
a−1
, (19)
¯ c =
(η + ξ)(ρ + γ)
(ξ + r − ρ)
(¯ b
G +¯ q¯ k −¯ b
P) (20)
+
ξ(ρ + γ)
(r + γ)(ξ + r − ρ)
£
σe
−ηπ − φ(1 − e
−ηπ)
¤
−
η(ρ + γ)(ξ + r + γ)(e−π(r+γ) − e−ηπ)
(ξ + r − ρ)(r + γ − η)(r + γ)
(φ + σ),
¯ b
P =
1
(r − η + γ)
³ηw0
η+ξ
´1−a
A¯ k
a −
(¯ q2 − 1)
2g(r − η + γ)
¯ k (21)
−
ge
(r − η + γ)
−
1
(r − η + γ)
¯ c,19
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¯ b
G = φ
(1 − e−ηπ)
(r − η + γ)
+
τ
(r − η + γ)
³ηw0
η+ξ
´1−a
A¯ k
a (22)
−
ge
(r − η + γ)
− σ
e−ηπ
(r − η + γ)
.
The ﬁrst two equations characterise the equilibrium in the supply side of the
economy. The shadow price of capital (eq. (18)) and the capital stock per capita
(eq. (19)) take the usual values in models where capital is costly to install. Note
that the capital stock per capita depends positively on the eﬃciency term (
ηw0
η+ξ).
Equilibrium consumption (eq. (20)) does not only depend on capital and bonds
but also on pensions and taxes and on the demographic structure. Private debt per
capita (eq. (21)) is the diﬀerence between output and total expenses for capital,
consumption and public expenditure. Public borrowing per capita (eq. (22)) is the
gap between tax revenues and expenditure for public consumption and pensions
which are all demography dependent.
3 Quantitative Analysis of Public Pension Re-
form Options in the Face of a Declining Pop-
ulation
In this section we assess the impact of pension reforms under diﬀerent ﬁscal sce-
narios. First we describe the calibration of the model, then the simulation method,
and ﬁnally we provide results for three policy experiments.
3.1 Simulation method
The system of diﬀerential equations is non-linear and cannot be solved analytically.
Numerical methods are required to solve for the transition path.
A number of algorithms have been proposed to solve this boundary value prob-
lem. Well known examples include shooting and projection methods (Judd 1992),
time elimination (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991)) and the method proposed
by Mercenier and Michel (1994). Trimborn et al (2006) provide a critical survey
of these methods and introduce a relaxation procedure to solve for the transition
path. They argue that this relaxation method outperforms other proposed solu-
tion methods in high dimension systems such as those encountered in this paper.
Here, we adopt their proposed solution.20
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Trimborn et al’s method works as follows: Consider the following system of N1
diﬀerential equations:
˙ Y = F · Y,
and N2 static equations
Z(.) − K · Y =0 ,
that are assumed to describe the dynamics of the economic problem at hand.
There are n1 initial conditions and n2 terminal conditions such that N1 = n1+n2.
The problem is transformed into a ﬁnite (discrete) time interval by choosing
a set of M mesh (grid) points in time. At each of these mesh points, the system
of N1 diﬀerential equations is approximated using the midpoint rule. This gives a
system of M × N e q u a t i o n st h a th a v et ob es o l v e ds i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T r i m b o r net
al (2006) propose a Gauss-Newton method that can be used to ﬁnd a root for the
system in an eﬃcient way.
3.2 Calibration
The values assigned to the exogenous parameters are given in Table 2 and are
taken from the existing growth, real business cycle and macroeconomic literature.
It should be noted that the selected parameter values are representative of a range
of economies with emphasis on European economies rather than being speciﬁct o
one individually.
Following Heijdra and Ligthart (2006), the subjective discount factor is set
at 4% with the real interest rate assumed to be 3%. The productivity factor
in the production function is set equal to 1 and the share of capital is assumed
to be 0.36, which is standard in the literature. Under the benchmark scenario,
population is assumed to be decreasing. The death rate of 1% is broadly in line with
population data (see United Nations, 2006). We consider birth rates of 0.8% in the
experiments with declining population and 1% when population remains constant.
The rate of depreciation is 10% as in Collard and Dellas (2004). The adjustment
cost parameter is chosen to ensure a realistic proﬁle for capital adjustment. The
main implications of the model are unaﬀected if a higher or lower value is chosen.
We consider a range of values for the pension age, the coeﬃcient of diminishing
labour productivity and the reaction coeﬃcient β. This last parameter is particu-
larly important in determining the implications of shocks to the pension system.
In the benchmark case π is set to give a total dependency ratio of 0.5 which is in
line with the EU statistics (see United Nations, 2006). Similarly the value of β
gives a realistic steady state public debt which is around 65% of GDP.21
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The choice of lump-sum pension (σ) and the government expenditure (G) im-
plies an initial level of public debt to GDP ratio which is similar to the one prevalent
in EU countries. Note that the shape of the transition paths of the main variables
is unaﬀected by the calibrated values of G and σ5.
Table 2: Calibrated Parameter Values
ρ =0 .04 subjective discount factor
r =0 .03 real rate of interest
η =0 .008 birth rate
γ =0 .010 death rate
a =0 .36 share of capital
π =1 2 5 parameter that determines the dependency ratio
A =1 productivity factor
g =3 adjustment costs of investment
ξ =0 .014 coeﬃcient of diminishing productivity of labour
σ =0 .40 lump sum pension
G =0 .10 government expenditure
δ =0 .10 depreciation rate of capital
τ =0 .08 corporate tax rate on ﬁrms’ gross output
β =0 .3 coeﬃcient of tax response on public debt
3.3 Pension cuts with lump sum taxes response
The ﬁrst experiment considers a suspension of the public pension beneﬁt σ to old
households. The reform takes place after ﬁfty periods and all agents are aware of
this ﬁscal development. The perfect foresight assumption implies that the adjust-
ment process starts immediately. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of main variables
when the public pension system is suspended in ﬁfty periods. The shock in this
case is modeled as σ → 0 at period ﬁfty. The graphs are drawn for the benchmark
values of the parameters. Sensitivity analysis for diﬀerent values of the productiv-
i t ya n dt a xr e a c t i o nc o e ﬃcients (ξ and β), retirement age (π), public beneﬁt( σ),
and the birth rate (η) parameters can be seen in the appendix.
Consumption initially falls and hits its lowest point at period ﬁfty: agents in-
crease their savings, especially households who expect to be alive at the period of
the reform. Note that as we examine a complete abolition of the pension system
in this experiment, we observe large falls in public debt and also an instantaneous
fall in the lump sum tax paid by young households after period 50. Due to an-
ticipated tax cuts, private consumption does not fall strongly in period 50 (only
0.8%)) and increases afterwards to its new long run equilibrium level. The fall in
5Only the initial and ﬁnal steady state values change but the shape of the transition path
remains the same.22
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consumption around the time of the public pension cut comes mainly from the
generation which is currently working and expects to retire around period 50 This
generation increases its savings in order to subsidise its income for the period be-
tween the retirement and the fall of the income tax. The shorter is the period of
the tax response the lower is the increase in savings and the fall in consumption.
The current retired generation does not change its savings pattern as it does not
expect to be alive in period 50. Intuitively the higher is the retired population
in period 0 the lower will be the fall in the aggregate per capita consumption at
period 50.
To ensure ﬁscal sustainability the lump-sum income tax φ adjusts automatically
to variations in public debt (see eq.(10)). Nevertheless the government can choose
the speed of adjustment and hence it indirectly aﬀects the level of public debt and
the tax.
Note that the cut of the public pension and the fall of the lump sum tax do
not aﬀect the supply side of the economy6. This is because the marginal product
of capital (MPK) which aﬀects investment and output does not depend on these
parameters. Hence the MPK in steady state depends on population characteristics,
adjustment costs and the rates of interest and depreciation:
MPK = aA
µ
ηw0
η + ξ
¶
Aa(1 − τ)
(r + δ)¯ q +
(¯ q−1)2
2g
.
All adjustments take place in the demand side: The levels of consumption,
private and public bonds change for the same level of output.
Table 3 and all tables that follow show a percentage change of the main macro-
economic variables for diﬀerent periods over time compared to the initial steady
state at period t =0 . They show how much those variables change in 10 periods
after the announcement of the pension cut, when this policy is implemented in 50
periods and when the economy has converged to the new steady state.
σ
time t=10 t=52 t=inf
C -0.01 -0.23 0.37
Bp -13.31 -197.90 -157.73
Bg 0.00 0.00 -59.54
K 0.00 0.00 0.00
O 0.00 0.00 0.00
Y 0.00 0.00 0.00
φ 0.00 0.00 -99.92
σ=0
Table 3: Percentage change from initial steady state. Variables are ex-
pressed in per capita terms.
6Bettendorf and Heijdra (2005) obtain a change in capital stock in response to this shock
because their production sector consists of producers of traded and non traded goods.23
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Figure 1: Dynamics following suspension of public pension and decrease of the
lump sum tax.
It is important to note that the path of consumption, tax and private debt
depends on the tax reaction function that the government has set initially. If
government has chosen a quick adjustment process (high β)t h e nl o w e ri n c o m e
taxation commences immediately after the shock and the cost in terms of a fall
in consumption is lower. On the other hand, when after shock tax adjustment is
delayed, households need to increase savings to smooth consumption for the years
after the pension cut. A quick post-shock compensation will not substantially
alter the optimal decisions of the current young generation. The speed of the tax
response involves redistribution of wealth across generations. An inﬂexible tax
system, for instance, will leave current young generations worse oﬀ while future
generations will enjoy higher levels of consumption and lower levels of public and
national debt. Hence the tax reaction function is an eﬀective policy instrument
for wealth reallocation across generations.
This argument can be illustrated in the following experiment where four iden-
tical economies start at the same level of public debt but follow diﬀerent ﬁscal24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 863
February 2008
0 50 100 150
1.16
1.18
1.2
1.22
1.24
1.26
1.28
Consumption
time
0 50 100 150
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
Income Tax
time
0 50 100 150
0.815
0.82
0.825
0.83
Wage
time
0 50 100 150
1.28
1.285
1.29
1.295
Output
time
0 50 100 150
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
Public Debt
time
0 50 100 150
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Private Debt
time
 
 
β=0.3
β=0.05
β=0.15
β=0.9
Figure 2: Dynamics following cuts in public pension and in lump sum tax, for
diﬀerent values of the tax reaction coeﬃcient β.
responses. The calibration for Figure 2 is diﬀerent from the benchmark case: for
simplicity public expenditure has been chosen to give zero public debt initially.
When β is very low, consumption ﬂuctuates substantially and falls a lot before
the reform even though it is higher in the long run. However for certain values
of β such as 0.3 consumption and private debt stay almost at the same levels7.
This indicates that economies that do not need to change their debt levels but
wish to proceed to pension reforms can do so without a large negative impact on
consumption.
7When the tax response is very slow (β =0 .05) the economy still converges to a new equilib-
r i u mb u ti tc a n n o tb es e e ni nt h i sﬁgure as convergence occurs in 350 periods.25
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β
time t=10 t=50 t=inf t=10 t=50 t=inf t=10 t=50 t=inf t=10 t=50 t=inf
C -0.01 -0.20 0.32 -0.04 -1.19 11.96 -0.01 -0.45 1.42 0.00 -0.02 -0.29
Bp -0.27 -3.94 -3.14 -1.55 -22.98 -134.97 -0.59 -8.73 -15.22 -0.02 -0.37 3.43
Bg 0.00 0.00 -96954 0.00 0.00 -96952 0.00 0.00 -96953 0.00 0.00 -96949
K 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
φ 0.00 0.00 147.54 0.00 0.00 366.94 0.00 0.00 167.58 0.00 0.00 136.64
β=0.3 (default) β=0.05 β=0.15 β=0.9
Table 4: Percentage change from initial equilibrium for various tax responses (β).
3.4 Pension cuts combined with proportional tax response
In this experiment public pensions are again suspended at period ﬁfty. However,
in this case the government does not adjust the lump sum tax paid by young
households but the proportional tax on gross output paid by ﬁrms. In the previous
experiment both the pension beneﬁt σ and the income tax φ were lump sum and
their alteration caused no distortions to the economy. In contrast the use of the
proportional tax on output changes the equilibrium level of output, capital stock
and real wage. This can be a more realistic case as there is a widespread discussion
about linking pensions to ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀects of the composite shock. We have used the same
parameter values as before with the only exception that the lump sum income tax
is exogenous (φ =0 .10)w h i l et h ec o r p o r a t et a xr a t eτ is endogenous and adjusts
to changes to per capita public debt and output:
τ(t)=
βB(t)g
(
ηw0
η+ξ)1−aAk(t)a. (23)
In this exercise consumption falls slightly in anticipation of the reform to in-
crease substantially to a higher long run steady state (39% higher than the initial
one). The reason for this is that agents internalise future wealth eﬀects coming
from higher returns of their equity holdings and do not alter considerably their
savings. Zero pensions will decrease public debt which in turn induces a decrease
in the tax rate on ﬁrms’ gross output. The marginal product of capital rises and
triggers higher investment, output and wages.
In this model economy the cut of public pensions has occurred at a very small
cost: the short run is characterised by a very mediocre fall of consumption (0.2%)
(see Table 5) while the long run demonstrates only positive eﬀects: higher per
capita consumption, output, and wage levels, while public and private indebtedness
have been reduced considerably.26
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Figure 3: Dynamics following pensions and corporate tax rate cuts.
beta
time t=10 t=52 t=inf
C -0.02 -0.21 39.67
Bp -2.48 -2.62 -111.12
Bg 0.00 0.00 -80.00
K 0.00 0.00 67.97
O 0.00 0.00 67.97
Y 0.00 0.00 67.97
φ 0.00 0.00 -83.41
β=0.15
Table 5: Percentage change from initial steady state.
3.5 Increase in retirement age
In this experiment we do not implement pension cuts but decrease the age depen-
dency parameter π so that the retirement age increases at period 50. In this set up
a higher retirement age does not solve the problem of pension systems unsustain-
ability. Noticeably, public debt falls very little while the lump sum tax required27
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Figure 4: Dynamics following a decrease of the age dependency parameter π.
to support this economy does not decrease much. As expected, per capita con-
sumption does not ﬂuctuate much as individuals will receive pension beneﬁts in
the future. This slight fall of consumption that we observe in Figure 4 is due to
falling labour income combined with the delay of pension beneﬁts. Agents should
increase their savings to smooth their consumption for the time period between
very low wage income and retirement.
In a model without diminishing productivity and wages, we would expect to
see a pure wealth eﬀect and a rise in per capita consu m p t i o na sa g e n t sw o r ku n t i l
late in their lives and can aﬀord to decrease their savings holdings. In other words
such a policy does not decrease national indebtedness (see Figure 4) as it does
not motivate agents to save more. In this model this policy does not promote
private savings which may be needed in an ageing economy. In addition, it does
not alleviate young households from the income tax they have to pay to support
such a system. The public sector also remains heavily indebted.28
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π
time t=10 t=52 t=inf
C 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bp -0.29 -1.78 0.52
Bg 0.00 0.00 -4.58
K 0.00 0.00 0.00
O 0.00 0.00 0.00
Y 0.00 0.00 0.00
φ 0.00 0.00 -11.64
π=135
Table 6: Percentage change from initial steady state.
Next we repeat the same experiment (implementation of a policy which re-
sults in the decrease of the dependency ratio) accompanied by a decrease of the
corporate tax rate. This policy mix produces higher output in the long run from
the previous one due to the elimination of a distortion. Consumption does not
change much until period 50 because the loss from wage income is compensated
by the wealth eﬀects coming from higher output and equity holdings. We can see
in Table 7 that the long run picture of the main macroeconomic variables does not
change substantially: A decrease of the dependency ratio by 8% causes a fall of
public debt in the long run by 18.5 % which in turn lowers the tax rate for ﬁscal
sustainability. The lower proportional tax triggers output which reaches a higher
level and ﬁnally boosts consumption by 1.5%. However the policy of suspending
the public pensions and lowering the corporate tax rate in Section 3.4 produces
higher levels of consumption, output, wage and lower levels of public and national
debt.
π
time t=10 t=52 t=inf
C 0.00 0.10 1.45
Bp -0.37 -2.50 -18.42
Bg 0.00 -7.21 -7.69
K 0.00 1.32 2.43
O 0.00 1.88 2.43
Y 0.00 1.88 2.43
φ 0.00 -7.65 -8.48
π=135
Table 7: Percentage change from initial steady state.
4 Conclusions
This paper studies the eﬀects of alternative macroeconomic policies to reform
public pension systems in a Yaari-Blanchard overlapping generations framework
that incorporates demographic structure, life cycle behaviour and a public pension
system.
We carry out three experiments: in the ﬁrst two experiments public pensions
are suspended and the government does not support the transition period, implying29
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Figure 5: Dynamics following a decrease of the age dependency parameter π ac-
companied by a decrease of the corporate tax rate.
that the generation alive during the transition will bear the burden by paying for
the existing pensioners and saving for its own retirement. In the third case we
study the macroeconomy under the hypothesis of a rise in the pension age.
The ﬁndings suggest that when drastic pension cuts are accompanied by a
reduction of the corporate distortionary tax on ﬁrms’ gross output, the adverse
eﬀects on per capita consumption are minimised in the short run while only positive
eﬀects on the economy are displayed in the long run: Output and consumption
are higher whilst private and public indebtedness reach lower levels.
The same impact on the demand side can be observed when a lump sum income
tax is used instead. However, the supply side remains unaﬀected by these ﬁscal
measures and their impact on the long run consumption is considerably smaller.
The outcome of both these policies is aﬀected by the reaction function that
the government uses to adjust to public debt developments. In other words if the
government reacts rapidly and adjusts taxes then the negative impact of lower
pensions on consumption can be minimised.30
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The last policy experiment concerns increasing the retirement age and leaves
the amount of pension beneﬁts unchanged. This policy appears to be unsuccessful
in economies with high levels of public debt especially if the aim is lower public
indebtedness. Even if this policy measure is able to sustain the current ﬁscal
position, the young generations in a declining population world eventually have to
pay high taxes to sustain it.31
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5 Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis of Key Para-
meters
In this appendix we examine the sensitivity of our results for diﬀerent values of
the diminishing wage factor ξ,t h ep e n s i o nb e n e ﬁt σ, the pension age π, the birth
ratio η, and the tax reaction on public debt parameter β. In all these experiments
public pensions terminate at period ﬁfty (σ50 =0 ) and the income lump sum tax
φ falls according to the movement of the public debt.
5.1 Sensitivity analysis for the coeﬃcient of diminishing
labour productivity (ξ)
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Figure A1: Sensitivity analysis for the coeﬃcient of diminishing labour productivity (ξ)
ξ
time t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf
C -0.02 -0.81 2.14 0.01 -0.13 3.93 0.00 -9.82 0.81 -0.04 -2.56 1.27
Bp -2.63 -51.07 -74.09 -2.70 -0.95 -3.90 0.00 0.68 1.42 -0.78 3.99 3.42
Bg 0.00 0.00 -70.40 0.00 0.00 -70.40 0.00 0.00 -70.40 0.00 0.00 -70.40
K 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
fi 0.00 0.00 -95.18 0.00 0.00 -95.18 0.00 0.00 -95.18 0.00 0.00 -95.18
ξ=0.014 ξ=0.001 ξ=0.8 ξ=0.05
Table A1: Percentage change from initial equilibrium values32
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Net Foreign Indebptedness Public Debt Tax
5.2 Sensitivity analysis for the tax reaction coeﬃcient (π)
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Figure A2: Sensitivity analysis for the tax coeﬃcient β
beta
time t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf
C -0.02 -0.81 2.14 -0.09 -3.08 29.37 -0.01 -0.33 0.12 0.00 0.02 -0.95
Bp -2.63 -51.07 -74.09 -9.95 -12.59 -70.73 -1.06 852.08 78.89 0.07 -2.33 -63.97
Bg 0.00 0.00 -70.40 0.00 0.00 -70.40 0.00 0.00 -70.40 0.00 0.00 -70.39
K 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
fi 0.00 0.00 -95.18 0.00 0.00 -79.92 0.00 0.00 -99.95 0.00 0.00 -103.40
β=0.15 β=0.05 β=0.3 β=0.9
Table A2: Percentage change from equilibrium values
5.3 Sensitivity analysis for the lump sum pension (σ)
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Figure A3: Sensitivity analysis for the pension beneﬁt σ33
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σ
time t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf
C -0.02 -0.81 2.14 -0.01 -0.20 0.53 -0.04 -1.23 3.25 -0.05 -1.66 4.38
Bp -2.63 -51.07 -74.09 -0.65 -28.73 -41.68 -3.99 -55.90 -81.09 -5.38 -58.68 -85.11
Bg 0.00 0.00 -70.40 0.00 0.00 -37.29 0.00 0.00 -78.10 0.00 0.00 -82.63
K 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
fi 0.00 0.00 -95.18 0.00 0.00 -83.16 0.00 0.00 -96.74 0.00 0.00 -97.53
σ=0.4 σ=0.1 σ=0.6 σ=0.8
Table A3: Percentage change from equilibrium values
5.4 Sensitivity analysis for the age dependency parameter
(π)
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Figure A4: Sensitivity Analysis for the parameter π that determines age dependency.
π
time t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf
C 0.00 -0.02 0.37 0.00 -0.02 0.37 0.00 -0.02 0.36 0.00 -0.02 0.37
Bp -4.12 -25.49 -157.72 -3.83 -23.73 -157.41 -3.65 -22.62 -158.55 -4.57 -28.29 -160.08
Bg 0.00 0.00 -59.54 0.00 0.00 -57.60 0.00 0.00 -55.63 0.00 0.00 -61.45
K 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
φ 0.00 0.00 -99.93 0.00 0.00 -99.92 0.00 0.00 -99.91 0.00 0.00 -99.93
π=125 π=135 π=145 π=115
Table A4: Percentage change from equilibrium values.34
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5.5 Sensitivity analysis for the birth rate (η)
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Figure A5: Sensitivity Analysis for the birth rate η
η,γ
time t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf t=10 t=52 t=inf
C -0.02 -0.81 2.14 -0.02 -0.75 1.44 -0.02 -0.83 2.19 -0.02 -0.83 2.06
Bp -2.63 -51.07 -74.09 -2.74 226.42 179.67 -2.50 -30.71 -52.17 -2.34 -22.43 -41.73
Bg 0.00 0.00 -70.40 0.00 0.00 -74.29 0.00 0.00 -67.62 0.00 0.00 -64.71
K 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
W 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
fi 0.00 0.00 -95.18 0.00 0.00 -95.47 0.00 0.00 -95.03 0.00 0.00 -94.92
η=0.008,γ=0.010 η=0.005, γ=0.010 η=0.010, γ=0.010 η=0.012,γ=0.010
Table A5: Percentage change from equilibrium values35
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